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Abstract 
Formulating and implementing agricultural policies are important for the development of the 
agricultural sector and the rural population. The process of policy making is a political 
bargain between politicians and citizens. The outcome of this process, the policies, cannot be 
expected to be Pareto efficient resource allocations since altruistic behaviour is not very 
likely. All participants in the process have their own agenda.  
 Thailand is the world’s largest rice exporter and one of the most efficient producers. 
Rice policies in Thailand have always been rather sensible due to the export orientation of 
the agricultural sector. Interventions in the rice market were first introduced after the Second 
World War, when export taxes were implemented. Influenced by the development on the 
world rice market and the domestic economy, rice policies have been altered during the 
decades. In the 1980s Thailand abolished the export taxes and rice policies were liberalized.   
 In the beginning of the 21st century the Thai government introduced a new rice price 
policy that has been in use on and off since the introduction. The policy functions as a 
mortgage program in favour of the producers. When the Samak government reintroduced the 
price policy for the crops in 2008, the pledging price was the highest ever. This had a 
negative effect on the domestic rice market and also consequences for the rice trade. Due to 
the high prices, export orders went down as the importers decided to wait for rice from 
cheaper producer countries. Millers had problems joining the mortgage program due to lack 
of credit and high requirements. The policy has undermined the market forces and therefore 
also negatively affected the integration of the rice market. If the policy is sustained with high 
pledging prices, there is a risk of large negative effects in the long run since farmers’ 
incentives to reduce costs and become more effective might be harmed.  
 The rationale behind the program was most likely not economic but rather political. 
The peculiar political situation in Thailand might have triggered the new government to 
launch the program in order to receive support from farmers even though a negative impact 
on the domestic rice market and the rice trade was very likely.    
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1. Introduction 
 
Thailand has been the largest exporter of rice in the world since the end of the Second World 
War. This success explains why several studies have been conducted throughout the years 
about the Thai rice market, on the rice policies and their effects on the market. Even though 
Thailand always has been export oriented, the rice sector enjoyed quite a lot of protection 
against rice imports. After joining the GATT in the early 1980s, Thailand liberalized its 
policies and most of the distortions were removed.  
 A new rice price policy was introduced in 2001. This policy functioned as a mortgage 
program in which farmers were able to get a fixed minimum price for their rice, which was 
slightly higher than the market price. Since 2001, the government has used the program on 
and off and when it was reintroduced in early 2008 it had not been used for about two years. 
For the first crop of 2008 the pledging price was 10,000 bath and for the second crop the 
price was increased to 14,000 bath, which was the highest pledging price ever. The 
reintroduction of the mortgage program was done during a time when the world market 
prices of rice were increasing sharply. Hence, pure economic considerations could not have 
been the motive. 
 Implementing the price policy for the second crop, during a time when the world 
market prices had reached its highest level in 25 years, resulted in a lot of criticism from 
various economists and people involved in the rice trade.1   
 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to study Thailand’s rice policy, both in a historic perspective and 
the current policies with emphasis on the price policy.2 The study will try to answer questions 
about the policy, such as what effects the mortgage program has had on the prices and the 
supply of rice. A brief discussion about the rationales behind it will also be included. Further, 
the development on the world market will also be taken into account since the recent price 
increases have been in sharp contrast with how the prices have behaved in the past 25 years.  
 
 
 
                                                
1
 See chapter 5. 
2
 The minimum price policy will also be called the mortgage program from here onwards. 
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1.2 Method and Data 
Data have been collected from international data bases such as the World Bank, the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) and from the national data base; The National Statistics Office of Thailand (NSO). 
Scientific articles and studies of the Thai rice sector and the world market have been used as 
well as secondary sources such as news articles containing interviews with key persons in the 
rice sector, and concerning the most recent development in Thailand. With the collected 
information as the basis, attempts to answer the questions asked in this study have been 
made. The conclusions are opinions by the author alone if nothing else is stated. 
  
1.3 Delimitation 
There are a few things that need to be mentioned about this study. The study focuses on the 
mortgage program and its effects on the prices and the functioning of the market. There are 
other policies affecting the rice sector but they will only briefly be mentioned.  
 Secondly, since the end of 2007 there has been a lot of turbulence on the rice world 
market and within the Thai rice sector. We have not yet seen the end of the price 
development and the effects of the high price levels. Since the development has been so rapid 
and there are so many players involved, it has been necessary to put a time limit after which 
new data and information have not been included. The section concerning the development 
on the world market ends in August 2008. 
 The last thing to be mentioned is that there were some problems finding information 
about the mortgage program, especially for the second crop of 2008 since it was only decided 
by the Thai government very recently and implemented in June. The program just ended and 
the full effects of it will not be known until later. Further, most of the information concerning 
the Thai rice market and the government’s rice policies are in the Thai language. Even 
though some were translated into English, I am sure that there is information that I have 
missed.  
 
1.4 Outline 
The study is structured as follows. The next section deals with agricultural policy. The 
process of policy making and the rationales behind it are explained, as well as the effects of 
policies, and common problems. The third section describes the patterns of the world rice 
prices and discusses the reasons for the sharp price increases on the world market since the 
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end of 2007. The fourth section of this study introduces Thailand as the world’s largest rice 
exporter. The history of rice policy in Thailand and the policies introduced since the 
beginning of the 21st century are described. The fifth section analyzes the actors involved in 
the rice industry and how the rice marketing system functions. The mortgage programs 
effects on prices and the market are analyzed and the government’s reasons for reintroducing 
the policy and the opinions of key actors in the rice sector are discussed. The last section 
summarizes the findings of this study.  
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2. Agricultural Policy 
 
Most countries in general and developing countries in particular have implemented policies 
that affect the agricultural sector either directly or indirectly. These policies can take various 
forms and have both intended and unintended effects. This section will explain the logic 
behind policies and how they are formulated. The rationales behind different types of policies 
and measures will be described as will some of their effects. 
 
2.1 Policy Making 
The formation of policies can be considered as the result of political bargaining between a 
country’s politicians on the one hand and the citizens on the other. The citizens can either act 
in the form of lobby groups with special interests or as individuals who trade their votes for 
specific policy action (de Gorter and Swinnen, 2002). When policies are formulated, it 
cannot be assumed that the persons involved are being altruistic in the sense that they are 
tying to achieve a Pareto efficient resource allocation.3 The degree of autonomy that 
politicians enjoy is different, and they have different objectives behind their decision making. 
Some might have the objective of getting re-elected while others have visions of improving 
their countries and increasing welfare. Further, in order to formulate policies and exercise 
control, information is needed and information is not a free good. Policymakers’ power and 
preferences are conditional upon the institutions within the public sector in their country such 
as the bureaucracy structure etc. Hence, in order to understand and predict in what way 
interventions in the economy will be made by the government, the institutions must be 
studied (Gravelle and Rees, 2004, pp. 340-344).  
 Different types of external shocks such as economic crises can give policy makers 
incentives and more power to create and implement policies than what would have been the 
case normally. However, the most common scenario is that politicians try to maximize their 
political support, which generally is associated with the presumed changes in welfare as a 
result of different policies. It is common that politicians try to support groups in the society 
whose welfare is declining compared to other groups. In democracies, in particular 
democracies with large numbers of farmers, farmers’ votes can be very influential. However, 
in developing countries farmers often lack strong organization, leadership, human and social 
                                                
3
 For further information see the theory of government failure and policies, see for example Gravelle 
and Rees (2004), pp. 340-344. 
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capital etc, which results in their interests being poorly represented and, hence, policies tend 
to have an urban bias or bias towards the landed elite. In developed countries on the other 
hand, farmers usually have created very strong organizations which have considerable impact 
on the policy making (World Bank, 2008, p. 43). 
 
2.2 Why Agricultural Policy? 
Some policies are more politically acceptable and politically effective due to imperfect 
information on welfare effects than other policies that would be better from an economic 
point of view. However, due to the nature of politicians’ preferences and objectives, the 
former type is usually the one chosen. An example of this is price support measures. Feeding 
its population has always been an important issue for governments in developing countries 
and stable domestic prices and self-sufficiency in the most important staple crops have been 
essential. In Asia for example, self-sufficiency in rice production has been considered critical 
for both economic and social reasons as well as for political reasons. However, achieving 
self-sufficiency through price support measures is politically more feasible than direct 
income transfers and therefore price support has been the favoured measure (World Bank, 
2008, p. 44).  
 According to Krueger at al. (1991), there three main reasons are used to justify 
interventions such as direct and indirect taxation of agriculture. Firstly, in countries where 
the formal sector is small or the institutional capacity of collection of other taxes is low, 
taxing trade in agricultural products is relatively easy. Secondly, since agriculture is quite 
insensitive to incentives, fixing prices of agricultural products at low levels in urban areas 
does not result in a large reduction in agricultural output. The third reason is that primary 
products’ terms of trade appear to be declining over time. However, this quite negative view 
of the prospects for the agricultural sector has been reassessed to some extent (Krueger et al. 
1991, p. 3).  
 Binswanger and Deininger (1997) argue that the short run supply response of output 
in the agricultural sector is much more inelastic compared to other sectors and hence it has 
been easier for policymakers to implement discriminating policies in agriculture. However, 
in the long run agriculture is highly elastic and therefore policies have a large impact. Thus, 
getting the policies right is crucial for the development of the agricultural sector (Binswanger 
and Deininger, 1997, p. 1969).  
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 The World Bank concludes in its World Development Report 2008 Agriculture for 
Development that depending on how far a country has reached in its development, different 
types of challenges are prevailing. For the transforming countries to which Thailand belongs 
and which are characterised as countries in which agriculture no longer is a main contributor 
to the GDP but where poverty is mostly rural, the problems cannot be solved through 
protection or subsidies. Instead, it argues that:  
  
 “Addressing income disparities in transforming countries requires a comprehensive 
 approach that pursues multiple pathways out of poverty – shifting to high value 
 agriculture, decentralizing nonfarm economic activity to rural areas, and providing 
 assistance to help move people out of agriculture.” (World Bank, 2008, p. 2)  
 
2.3 Types of Policies 
Rural areas and agriculture are characterized by heterogeneity and this requires different 
types of policies. Policies have to be tailored to correspond to the specific conditions and 
needs within the sector or group of people that constitute the target. Amongst the toughest 
policy dilemmas is balancing attention between different groups given specific resource 
constraints.  
 The types of agricultural policies that first come into mind are the different types of 
direct measures available to governments that want to intervene in the agricultural sector. 
Measures such as government procurement, export quotas and direct taxation of exports, 
which are all direct and sector-specific, have the effect that they keep the prices received by 
producers of agricultural output lower than they would have been in equilibrium without 
distortions and interventions. However, there are also different types of measures that aim at 
benefiting producers of agricultural products. Quantitative restrictions and import tariffs have 
been commonly used to protect the domestic production of import-competing commodities. 
Many countries also provide subsidies to farmers in forms of low interest loans, credits, and 
critical inputs such as fertilizers, high quality seeds and pesticides etc (Krueger et al. 1991, p. 
1). Subsidizing private goods such as fertilizers and credit has often been the basis of 
agricultural spending. This spending is regarded as “…overall substantially less productive 
than investments in core public goods such as agricultural research, rural infrastructure, 
education, and health.” (World Bank, 2008, p. 41)   
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 Other types of interventions that have been commonly used in agricultural markets in 
developing countries are dual pricing systems in which producers have received high prices 
while consumers have been charged low prices, and the governments have paid the 
difference. Subsidies to poor urban consumers have also been given in the form of price 
ceilings etc. However, these types of policies have faced many problems, both administrative 
and economic.   
 Direct agricultural policies are created to have a specific effect, but there are policies 
that are created and implemented in other areas of the economy that also affect the 
agricultural sector. In international trade theory a policy that implements protection for a 
specific sector will at the same time impose a tax on other sectors of the economy. Policies 
concerning industrial protection are one such example, and macroeconomic policies are 
another. These types of policies affect the agricultural sector in the sense that they distort the 
production incentives by rendering agriculture “…more or less attractive than other sectors of 
the economy.” (Krueger et al. 1991, p. 1) There are various effects of policies that indirectly 
affect agriculture. For example, industrial protection causes the real exchange rate to 
appreciate, which works as a tax on the agricultural sector. Industrial protection also obliges 
producers of agricultural commodities to pay a price above the world market price for inputs, 
and it also causes farmers to have reduced purchasing power of manufactures. Further, 
macroeconomic polices have caused incomes from exports and import-competing products to 
lose purchasing power. Thus, it is clear that not only direct agricultural policies but the 
general economic policies in a country indirectly affect the agricultural sector profoundly 
(Krueger et al. 1991, p. 2).  
 
2.4 Effects 
Due to disparities within agriculture and the rural areas, policies are likely to have both losers 
and winners. Studies of the effects of different types of policies in developing countries, 
conducted for the World Bank, show that one of the most common effects is that 
agriculture’s share of gross domestic product decreases and that the growth of production and 
export of agricultural products slow down. When interventions have required a lot of 
administrative work, both producers and traders have tried to avoid the costs of the 
interventions, and hence illegal activities have increased (Krueger et al. 1991, p. 2). 
 Other findings showed that even though farmers benefited from the direct polices, the 
net effect of direct and indirect policies tended to be negative, thus taxing the producers of 
 14 
agricultural products. A negative effect has also been seen on the incentives to invest and 
implement new technology and techniques, causing out migration and reducing investments 
in agriculture (Kruger at al. 1991, p. 3).  
 In developing countries, it is common that farmers demand subsidies and protection 
since they are lagging behind the non-agricultural sectors of the economy. This creates a 
policy dilemma since these countries are subject to fiscal constraints and the opportunity 
costs of subsidies are reduced investments in “…public goods for growth and social services 
in rural areas.” (World Bank, 2008, p. 8)  
 The effects of different policies on output, government spending and balance of 
payments are often hard to predict and the policies do not always attain the expected 
reactions from different groups affected by the policies.  
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3. Price Patterns on the World Rice Market 
 
Trade in rice has always been very limited; only a small percentage of the total world 
production has been sold on the world market. In 2007 only around seven percent of total 
production was traded on the market. The large rice economies, especially the Asian 
countries, have had policies of self-sufficiency in rice, hence only turning to the world 
market in times of deficiency. As a result of the limited trade, the world market prices have 
been fluctuating. After the Green Revolution4 there was a large increase in rice supply and 
prices decreased and became more stable. However, at the end of 2007 prices started to 
increase sharply. This section will describe the historic development in rice prices and try to 
explain the reasons for the recent price increases.     
 
3.1 Price Development 1960-2008 
At the beginning of the 2000s, world rice prices reached their lowest level since the 1960s. 
Rice started to show fluctuating but slowly increasing prices in 2001 and this continued until 
the end of 2007. Since October 2007, rice prices have increased dramatically. The export 
price of the commonly traded Thai rice 5 percent broken, free on board (FOB) in $US per 
ton, increased from 329.2 in October 2007 to 907 in April 2008. The fob price of Thai 
premium white rice reached 950 $US at the end of April after which it levelled out until the 
end of May when the price started to decline. In July 2008 the premium white rice declined 
to around $US 800 fob and prices have kept on declining every month (Prasertsi, 2008, p. 2).  
 Looking at rice price data from the beginning of the 1960s, two different periods can 
be seen. Between the early 1960s until the beginning of the 1980s, rice prices were highly 
fluctuating, with peaks in 1967, 1974 and 1981 with prices of 971, 1418 and 728 $US per ton 
respectively.  In 1971 and 1979 rice prices dipped, decreasing to 520 and 555 $US per ton 
respectively. Since the beginning of the 1980s until recently, prices have been relatively 
stable and low. 
 There are several reasons for the price fluctuations in the past. A very limited trade in 
rice with few large exporters made the supply to the world market sensitive to the 
development of individual exporters’ domestic markets. A production shortage due to crop 
failures could cause the world prices to rise. On the demand side of the market, production 
                                                
4
 The Green Revolution refers to the development within rice research and production that started in 
Asia in the early 1960s and then spread throughout the rice producing countries. For further 
information about the Green Revolution see for example www.irri.org or Pingali et al. (1997). 
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changes in large consuming countries have also had a large impact on the world prices. When 
large consumers, such as Indonesia, have had an unexpectedly high demand for rice from the 
world market due to domestic production shortages, world prices have increased. Other 
reasons for the price fluctuations were the two oil shocks which caused the prices of many 
commodities to rise (Wailes, 2005, p. 177).  
 In the early 1980s the results of the Green Revolution could be seen and Vietnam 
entered the export market (Ryan, 2002, p. 1). In the following years Vietnam and other 
exporting countries increased their exports and more countries engaged in the production, 
consumption and international trade of rice. The increased trade and number of actors on the 
market had a positive impact on the world market on which prices declined and became 
relatively stabile until they started to increase again in the early 2000s (Braun and Soledad 
Bos, 2005, p. 14). At the beginning of the 21st century the demand for rice started to increase 
faster than the supply. Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, which are 
not traditional rice consuming countries, increased their rice imports substantially.        
 
Figure 1: World market prices for Thai rice 1960-2008 
Price Development 1961-2008
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
$U
S 
pe
r 
m
e
tr
ic
 
to
n
 
Source: Prices 1961-2007 from IRRI World Rice Statistics and prices for 2008 from the World Bank Pink Sheet 
 
The graph above displays the price of Thai rice 5 percent broken (fob) between 1961 and 
2008 (average price Jan-Aug). Seen in this longer perspective, prices today have not 
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increased to historically extraordinary levels but they are still much higher than they have 
been for the past 30 years.    
 
3.2 Reasons for the Increasing Prices   
According to Dr. Randy Barker (2008), the Consultant and Acting Head at the Social 
Sciences Division at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), there are three reasons 
for the recent price increases. First of all, there is an imbalance between the supply and 
demand of rice. Secondly, prices of other commodities have increased as well, which has 
influenced the price of rice. The third reason is speculation by people involved in the rice 
production and trade. There is another factor that has to be mentioned, namely the 
depreciation of the US dollar which partly can explain the increased prices (Pandey, 2008, p. 
36) 
 
3.2.1 Supply and Demand 
In the 1960s and 1970s there were concerns about food security in Asia due to shortfalls in 
grain production at the same time as the population kept increasing. The release of the IR85 
and the Green Revolution resulted in large investments in irrigation and increased farming 
area. The increased rice production that followed this development led to a surplus of rice 
and low and fairly stable prices in the 1980s. 
 The surplus production and low prices, which were sustained until the beginning of 
the 2000s, have now disappeared due to the fact that increases in production have been 
outpaced by the increase in consumption. The decade between 1997 and 2007 witnessed a 
production growth rate of 0.75 percent whilst consumption grew at 0.94 percent. In order for 
countries to supply people with rice, rice stocks in the major stock holding countries were 
sold out. This trend has been reversed since the start of the price increase at the end of 2007 
(Barker 2008, p. 15).   
 There are several underlying factors to the slow increase of supply of rice. In the 
1970s large sums were invested in public agricultural R&D, especially in Latin America and 
Asia and investments increased for every year. Due to the large rice surpluses of the 1980s, 
there was a slowdown in agricultural investments. Increases in investment expenditure are 
much lower today and developed countries are on average even decreasing their investments 
                                                
5
 A new high-yielding and stronger rice variety developed by the IRRI in order to increase world 
production of rice so as to prevent a food crisis, especially in Asia. 
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in R&D. The lack of investments in research and development and rural infrastructure has 
resulted in a stagnation of rice yields. In the past decade, the Asian annual yield growth rate 
has been 0.61 percent but countries such as China, which is the largest rice producer in the 
world, and Myanmar have experienced decreasing rates lately (Barker, 2008, pp. 18-21).    
 There are also other underlying factors on the supply side. The rise in energy prices 
has led to a cost-price squeeze making it more difficult for farmers to be competitive and to 
make profits. There is also an increased pressure on different resources used in the 
production. Most countries are facing a water shortage which is a severe problem for rice 
farming since it is the most water-requiring grain crop. Countries such as Thailand that used 
to have an abundant water supply are now facing scarcity of surface water and increased 
water usage in the Northern region has resulted in a reduced inflow of water to the Central 
region, which is a large rice producing region (Poapongsakorn et al. 1998, p. 2). There are 
also pressures on land and labour. In Thailand, there is a shortage of labour in the rural areas 
during the main rice planting season since many young people have migrated to the cities and 
due to increased school enrolment (Poapongsakorn et al. 1998, p. 3). Other constraints to rice 
production are pressures on agricultural diversification and transformation, which are causing 
farmers to change crops. According to Baker (2008) there are also climate changes due to 
global warming affecting the rice production, at least in the short term.  
 In addition to the supply side factors there are also demand side factors behind the 
increased gap between world supply and demand. World population growth results in more 
people that have to be fed every year and thus increased consumption. Much of the increased 
consumption is in areas where there is not enough rice production to meet the regional 
demand, which has led to increased trade. Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Middle East are the three regions in which rice imports have increased the most since the 
1990s and even though there have been large increases in rice production in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Middle East, consumption has clearly outpaced production.   
 
3.2.2 Increasing Commodity Prices 
The increasing rice prices also depend on the increase of other commodity prices and 
increased prices of other food crops. Prices of corn, soya and wheat have all increased 
sharply in the past year. According to data from Bloomberg, FAO, and Jackson Son & Co., 
prices of corn, rice, soya and wheat increased by 31, 74, 87 and 130 percent respectively 
between March 2007 and March 2008. Prices of urea and fuel have increased sharply 
(Barker, 2008, p. 26), and the price of rice seeds and fertilizers has increased by almost 100 
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percent during the past year, all affecting the cost of production and therefore also the price 
of rice (Reuters 2008-04-20).   
 
3.2.3 Speculation    
Speculation and the behaviour of actors involved in the rice production and trade affect the 
rice prices. Due to production shortages and increased dependence on imports, many 
countries have changed their rice policies and regulations. The Philippines, which is one of 
the largest rice importers in the world, have abolished their import tax on rice but are using a 
domestic price stabilisation policy that have hindered domestic prices from increasing at the 
same pace as world prices. Philippine domestic prices of rice at all levels in the marketing 
system and prices of urea have only increased by 17-24 percent since 2006, while the price of 
Thai rice 5 percent broken has increased by over two hundred percent. Large exporting 
countries have also changed their behaviour due to the price increases and food security 
concerns. India and Vietnam, amongst others, have introduced export restrictions which 
further put restraints on the world market supply of rice (Barker, 2008, p. 30). Rice traders 
also speculate on rice prices, causing the prices to increase and to fluctuate. At the end of 
June 2008, Forbes reported on declining rice futures due to falling prices in Asia and due to 
reports that American rice growers’ plan to increase the planted area (Forbes 2008-06-25). 
However, the recent price increases of rice are not only due to speculation by private actors, 
but also by different governments.  
 According to Hanke (2008), governments worldwide responded to the increasing rice 
prices by increasing their stockholdings. These speculations have resulted in a supply and 
demand shock which have spurred the price increase further (Forbes 2008-06-25). Evidence 
that supports this argument is that prices have declined since the end of May. According to a 
USDA report by Ponnarong Prasertsri, Thai rice prices have declined as a result of a 
deceleration in export orders due to importers waiting for cheaper rice from producers such 
as Vietnam, which this year has experienced a large expansion of planted area (Prasertsri, 
2008, p. 2).   
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4. Rice in Thailand – Historical Aspects 
 
Since the middle of the 19th century Thailand has been one of the largest rice exporters in the 
world. With a suitable climate, abundant land resources, long tradition of rice farming and a 
sensible domestic rice policy, Thailand has managed to retain its position as the world’s 
leading rice exporter. Even though Thailand only produced around 4.4 percent of the total 
world production, which amounted to 627 million tons of paddy rice or 421 million tons of 
milled rice in 2007, Thai exports constituted some 30 percent of world exports. This is in 
sharp contrast to, for example, Vietnam and India, which constitute 5.5 and 22 percent of 
total production but only 17 and 11 percent respectively of total exports.6 In the following 
section, country characteristics and rice production in Thailand is described, followed by the 
history of the rice industry and the development of rice policies. 
 
4.1 Country Characteristics 
Thailand is a medium size country situated in Southeast Asia and shares boarders with four 
other countries; Laos in the northeast, Cambodia in the east, Malaysia in the south and 
Burma in the west to northwest. Thailand also borders towards two seas; the Gulf of Thailand 
and South China Sea in the east and the Andaman Sea and Indian Ocean in west. The climate 
is warm subhumid tropics and classified as AGEZ 2 (agroecological zone 2) (IRRI, 2000).  
 Independent of income, rice is the main staple food for the whole population but 
consumption of rice tends to decrease as incomes increase. Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
constitute around 10 percent of total GDP with a decreasing share. In 2005 agricultural 
exports amounted to 16 percent of total exports and agriculture employed some 40 percent of 
the population in 2006 (WTO, 2006, p. 105). Thailand has a population of 65.1 million 
people of which 16.2 million, or 3.7 million households, are rice farmers (IRRI, 2006). Thus, 
around 26.5 percent of the total population is involved in rice farming and the majority of the 
population lives in rural areas. According to the World Bank, Thailand is classified as a 
transforming country; characterised by declining importance of agriculture in GDP, very fast 
growing non-agricultural sectors, and high rural poverty. In Thailand there has been a large 
decrease in poverty in the past decades but most of it has occurred in urban areas. Between 
                                                
6
 For further rice production and export data etc see for example USDA 2007, IRRI World Rice 
Statistics or NSO.      
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1970 and 1999, poverty in urban areas declined 3.7 times faster than in the rural areas (World 
Bank, 2008, p. 36). 
 
4.2 Rice in Thailand 
The total cultivated area in Thailand amounts to 20,900 thousand hectares of which around 
half is devoted to rice farming. From the end of the 1960s until the early 1980s, land devoted 
to rice farming expanded rapidly due to the progress achieved with the Green Revolution and 
the efforts to increase rice production. Production increased from 12.4 million tons to 21.2 
million tons of paddy during the revolution’s first two decades (IRRI, 2000). In 2006 the 
total production of paddy rice was 29.5 million tons and, according to USDA, Thailand 
produced around 18.4 million tons of milled rice in 2007. Of the total milled rice, around 9 
million tons were exported, making Thailand the largest exporter of rice in the world with a 
market share of around 30 percent calculated from all varieties and qualities together. Around 
50 percent of the Thai exports are high quality long grain rice, which receives the highest 
price on the market (Vanichanont, 2004, p. 4). Thailand has been able to increase its exports 
almost yearly, as a result of a combination of increased production as well as a decrease in 
domestic per capita consumption (IRRI, 2000). 
 Figure 2 below shows the production of paddy rice and exports of milled rice in 
Thailand 1980-2007. The data used in the figure come from IRRI World Rice Statistics but is 
originally collected by USDA. There are a few different data bases with production and trade 
data, and usually the amounts of rice cited are slightly different. The rice data from USDA 
show overall smaller quantities than other data bases such as FAO but have the longest time 
series. 
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Figure 2: Thailand’s production of paddy rice and exports of milled rice 1980-2007. 
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 The average yield in 2006 was around 2.9 tons per hectare which is low compared to 
the world average of 4.1 and the Asian average of 4.2 tons per hectare (IRRI, 2007). A 
reason for this low yield is that Thailand mainly produces traditional low-yielding but high 
quality types of rice that acquire a higher world market price than the modern high-yielding 
varieties produced in many other countries. But even in Thailand, farmers are slowly 
changing the production towards new varieties and hybrid varieties, especially suitable for 
dry season farming. The main rice growing season, the wet season, stretches from June to 
August with harvesting in October to January. The second season, the dry season, stretches 
from February to April with harvesting taking place in April to June (Wiboonpongse and 
Chaovanapoonphol, 2001, pp. 190-191).  
 The low yield is also due to Thailand’s low percentage of irrigated farming area; most 
of the farming area is rainfed lowland (IRRI, 2000). In 2006, only around 15 percent of the 
total rice farming area was irrigated while 77 percent was rainfed lowland. Flood prone areas 
constitute only 5 percent and upland around 3 percent of the total rice area (IRRI, 2006).    
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 Thailand is divided into four regions; north, northeast, central and south. All the 
regions have different rice farming environments. The largest rice producing area is the 
northeast region in which the most famous rice variety, jasmine rice, is grown.7 One third of 
Thailand’s total area and around fifty percent of the total rice farming area are located in this 
region. It is also the most densely populated region. Farms in this region are predominantly 
family farms with small land holdings, producing mostly for their own needs. In cases of 
production surplus, rice is sold to the domestic market or to rice exporters. Rice is grown on 
the less favourable and more risky rainfed lowlands, with only one crop per year due to lack 
of irrigation. Only 20 percent of Thailand’s irrigated areas are located in this region, and less 
than ten percent of the land is planted with rice in the dry season. 
 In the central and northern regions, farms are commercialised to a much larger extent. 
Farm holdings are on average three times larger than in the northeast and production 
surpluses are larger. Rice is grown in more favourable environments with irrigated areas in 
the central plains and along the large Chao Phraya River, yielding more than one crop per 
year. One fifth of the wet season rice and almost 75 percent of the dry season rice is grown in 
the central region. Farms in the central region use high technology and are mechanized to a 
large extent. In addition to the large rice production, the central region is also home to a large 
share of the industry in Thailand which causes labour shortages in the rice peak seasons 
(IRRI, 2000).  
 In the northern region, rice is grown in upland areas or on terraces and lowland 
valleys where there is abundant water. This region has almost one third of Thailand’s total 
land area and around 20 percent of the total rice farming area. Farms in this region are also 
mechanized to a much larger extent compared to the northeast region (IRRI, 2000). 
 The southern region has only a small rice production. The environment is less suited 
for rice farming and in total only 14 percent of the total land area and six percent of the total 
rice area are located in the southern region. Due to this, local shortages of rice are common 
(IRRI, 2000).   
 
4.3 History of the Rice Industry and Rice Policy 
Agriculture and agricultural policy play an important role in the economy, especially for 
developing countries. A requirement for industrial development is a well functioning 
agricultural sector that can provide food at low and stable prices and labour to the industrial 
                                                
7
 The jasmine rice is called Hom Mali in Thai 
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sector. Agriculture can also earn foreign exchange and help in financing the industrial 
development and help create markets and stimulate demand for the products of the 
manufacturing sector (Rock, 2002, p. 485).  
 Traditionally the rice industry has had an important role in the Thai economy and rice 
still constitutes a rather large share of the GDP. Rice is the main staple food and involves all 
consumers independent of income; however, for many poor consumers rice is very important 
since it is the cheapest staple food (Vanichanont, 2004, p. 2). The rice industry employs a 
large share of the population and the majority of all farmers. Further, the rice industry has 
contributed to government revenues and rice exports contribute to foreign exchange earnings. 
In 2004, rice was exported to a value of around 1900 million US dollars (Vanichanont, 2004, 
p. 2). Due to the above facts, rice policy has been very important for the government and 
received a lot of attention from economists who have been analyzing the impacts from 
various policies (Wiboonpongse and Chaovanapoonphol, 2001, p. 193). Since Thailand has 
been a net agricultural exporter, the policies have been governed by this fact (Warr and 
Khopaiboon, 2007, p. 1). With the rapid industrialization in the past decades, the importance 
of the rice industry has been declining steadily. This decline has been followed by a shift in 
rice taxation policy; from a policy that collected high taxes from rice exporters in order to 
finance the industrialisation and which was largely paid for by farmers, to a policy that 
favours the rice farmers (Choeun et al. 2006, p. 104).  
 
4.3.1 Early Rice Policies – 1850s until the Second World War 
In the mid-1850s Thailand signed a treaty with Great Britain and adopted a free trade system 
that lasted until the Second World War. The result was a great increase in demand for rice 
from the western countries, which led to large public investments in infrastructure such as 
roads and canal constructions along the Chao Phraya River delta so that the large areas of 
uncultivated land could be turned into rice farming areas8 (Siamwalla and Setboonsarng, 
1991, p. 238).  
 Due to these investments, Thailand could produce enough rice to increase and sustain 
large rice exports and develop into a large rice economy. At this time, rice constituted more 
than 60 percent of Thailand’s total exports and around 30 percent of the total world rice 
exports (Siamwalla and Setboonsarng 1991, p. 239).         
 
                                                
8
 The expansion of cultivated land and the increase of cultivated land per worker in the agricultural 
sector lasted until the late 1970s.  
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4.3.2 Rice Policies from the 1950s 
The government interventions in the rice sector started after the Second World War when a 
rice export monopoly was created. In 1954 the government abandoned the monopoly and 
private exports were allowed, but subject to several taxes and regulations. The long history of 
export orientation of the agricultural sector made it possible for the Thai government to 
implement effective and straightforward rice policies. The aim was to stabilize prices, keep 
them low for consumers and to extract revenues. During the period 1950-1986, four 
instruments for intervention and taxation of exports were used. They all had different 
foundations and were controlled by different departments but all the revenues accrued to the 
government. Together these instruments resulted in an export taxation rate around 40 percent 
from the end of the 1950s until the beginning of the 1970s (Warr and Khopaiboon 2007, p. 
7).      
 From the 1950s until the 1970s, the Thai government used the high export taxes to 
extract revenues that could be used to industrialize the country and subsidize the urban 
citizens. The subsidy was made possible by introducing a “rice reserve requirement” which 
forced all exporters to grant the Ministry of Commerce rice at prices under the market price 
(Siamwalla and Setboonsarng 1991, p. 239). Since agriculture was not seen as a dynamic 
sector, it was also thought that agriculture would not lead to growth of the economy. The 
price elasticity of agricultural products was low, at least in the short run, and this made it 
possible to tax the agricultural production. Farmers in general, and rice farmers in particular, 
were poor, uneducated and lacked organization, which also made taxing agriculture attractive 
from a political point of view (Warr and Khopaiboon, 2007, p. 2).  
 The effects of the tax called the “rice premium”, together with other interventions 
resulted in more stable domestic prices which at the time was the goal of the rice price 
policies. However, another effect of the rice premium was that farmers had to carry most of 
the burden of the tax; hence they received much lower prices than would have been the case 
without the tax (Wiboonpongse and Chaovanapoonphol, 2001, p. 194).  
 The interventions also resulted in lower exports and since Thailand was a large 
country on the rice market, a higher world market price. This was achieved by the 
government by restricting the quantity of rice that was allowed to be exported in order to “… 
limit competition among exporters as a strategy for cartelizing the trade and thus for 
extracting additional monopoly profits from foreign buyers.” (Siamwalla and Setboonsarng, 
1991 p. 240) The extra profits from these limited exports mostly benefited the exporters 
themselves. Prices were profoundly affected in the domestic market. However, consumer 
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prices and the farm gate prices were only slightly affected. Instead it was the retail shops that 
received most of the profits from the cheap rice program, and the millers who acquired the 
profits from the producer price support program. From a political point of view the 
interventions were very important. 
 
4.3.3 Policies in the 1970s – The Phase out Period 
The period that followed the 1970s is characterized as a phase out period in which there was 
a sharp break with earlier rice tax policies and rice taxes were lowered. Even though the rate 
of export taxation increased to around 60 percent during the commodity price boom 1972-
1974, it declined rapidly afterwards to around 20 percent9 (Warr and Khopaiboon, 2007, p. 
7). In 1974 the Farmers’ Aid Fund Act was created. The Act stated that the revenue from the 
rice premium should accrue to an aid fund for the farmers. In this way, the government taxed 
the farmers and used the revenues to help the same farmers. Since the revenues no longer 
accrued to the Ministry of Commerce, the rice premium was no longer as attractive and 
instead the rice reserve requirement became the preferred intervention.  
 Another important change in the 1970s was that policies shifted from being pro 
consumer towards benefiting producers. The cheap rice program was slowly reduced in both 
amount and quality and was abandoned at the beginning of the 1980s. At the same time the 
support prices for farmers were gradually increased. The main purpose of the support 
program was to redirect profits from the export tax to the millers. The rice millers had 
substantial influence over politics since they were financiers of political campaigns and also 
in control over key votes. Since millers often worked as agents for the government in rice 
procurements, they were able to acquire a rather large share of the benefits of the program 
(Siamwalla and Setboonsarng, 1991, pp. 240-243).      
 
4.3.4 Free Trade Orientation 
At the beginning of the 1980s the Thai government changed its rice policy to be more free 
trade oriented. In 1982, Thailand signed the GATT agreement which played a role in 
liberalizing the rice policies (Kajisa and Akiyama, 2003, p. 7). In 1986 the rice premium was 
abolished and export subsides were introduced as a result of the downward trend in world 
food prices and the increasing income disparities between rural and urban areas (Chouen et 
                                                
9
 Except during the second OPEC oil price shock in 1979-1980 when the tax rate increased to around 
40 percent, all four export taxes gradually declined from the mid-1970s until they  were all abolished 
in 1986. 
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al. 2006, pp. 105-108). Overall, the 1980s was a decade devoted to liberalizing the rice 
policy; the Thai government more or less withdrew from the domestic market and let the 
world market determine the domestic rice prices. However, some interventions and support 
were still provided in the form of indirect measures which the farmers themselves could 
choose whether to use or not (Kajisa and Akiyama, 2003, pp. 14-15). Until the mid-1990s, 
the result of all interventions and policies concerning rice was a net taxation of rice 
production (Warr and Khopiaboon, 2007, p. 17). 
 The post-1980s liberalization of rice policies in Thailand was largely due to political 
considerations. Thailand had experienced rapid urbanization and urban incomes were 
increasing much faster than the rural incomes. The poverty disparities between rural and 
urban areas were increasing. The political climate in Thailand was also changing with more 
democratic institutions evolving (Warr and Khopaiboon, 2007, p. 3). 
 Since the mid-1980s policies such as mechanization of rice farms have been 
emphasised. Areas that are not the best suited for rice farming have become targets for 
diversifying crops and crop substitution. Sustainable farming such as crop rotation and 
organic farming has also been promoted (IRRI, 2000).  
 
4.4 Thailand’s Rice Policy in the 21st Century 
Rice policies and strategies to develop the rice sector in Thailand are developed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives together with the Ministry of Commerce. Before 
presenting the strategies for the Cabinet where they get approved, the National Rice Policy 
Committee has to take the policies and strategies under consideration. 
 Between 2007 and 2011, six strategies for sustainable development are to be 
implemented. The strategies concern different aspects of the domestic rice sector and include 
production and rice farmers’ development as well as product development and marketing. 
Marketing overseas are also included together with strategies for value creation and logistics 
development. The most controversial of the strategies is the one concerning rice price 
stabilization (BOT, 2007).      
 Even though the government withdrew from the domestic rice market in the 1980s it 
has again become very much engaged in the rice market. The Thaksin Shinawatra 
government that came into power in 2001 introduced a rice price guarantee policy that has 
largely undermined the market mechanism. The minimum price guarantee policy functions as 
a mortgage program in which the farmers can get low interest loans from the government 
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“…against the pledge of rice, with the pledged rice canceling the debt if rice prices do not 
meet a target.” (World Bank 2008, p. 36) In this way, farmers can sell their paddy rice to 
government agencies and also be able to buy back their paddy within 90 days at a three 
percent interest rate. The program is run by the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives (BAAC) and supervised by the Ministry of Finance (Prasertsri, 2008, p. 2). 
Since the guaranteed price is set much higher than the market price, the policy has resulted in 
large rice procurements by the government. During the main harvest period in late 2005 to 
early 2006, the government built up a stock of more than five million metric tons (Reuters 
2006-02-23). By the end of August 2008, the government had accumulated 2.82 million 
metric tons in stocks.  
 The government both exports rice on a government to government basis and  provids 
forms of export subsidies. The mortgage program has become very costly for the government 
and each time the program is run large sums are spent. After suspending the program for 
almost two years the Samak government reintroduced it. The regime gained power after the 
election following the military coup in 2006.   
 The mortgage program was launched with an intervention price of 10 000 bath per 
ton for the first harvest of 2008. In June 2008, the government decided to launch the program 
for the second harvest as well pledge a price of 14 000 baht per ton. The cost of this program 
was estimated at around 35 million baht and up to 2.5 million tons of paddy rice were to be 
bought before the end of the program on the 30th of September (The Nation 2008-06-10).  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
The most important influence on rice policies in Thailand has been the export orientation of 
the agricultural sector. This has limited the scope for intervention and the measures available 
to the government.  
 A few different trends can be destinguished in the development of rice policies. In the 
early period of intervention, the government taxed the agricultural sector heavily, especially 
the rice sector, since it was politically feasible. It was a way to gather revenues to 
industrialize the country without too much opposition. The farmers, who constituted the 
majority of the population and implied a large taxation base, had low political influence due 
to their lack of education and organization.   
 As the country became industrialized and urban incomes rose, income disparities 
between urban and rural areas increased. Farmers became more aware of the effects of the 
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policies and also better organized. This forced the government to change their policies 
towards being more producer oriented. By introducing the price support, the government 
increased income for the farmers but they also gained support from the millers who benefited 
largely from the price support and constituted an important political vote bloc. The 
abolishing of the rice premium and other export taxes also increased Thailand’s international 
status. Since Thailand became a member of GATT at this time, this could have influenced 
the policy decisions.   
 The introduction of the mortgage program in the 21st century could also be explained 
by politicians’ agenda to gain votes by increasing the income of the farmers who still 
constituted the majority of the population. There is however another important development 
that most surely played a role in the policy making and that is the price development in the 
world market. As could be seen in Figure 1, the world market prices for rice reached 
extremely low levels at the beginning of the 2000s. Since the price development at that time 
had been following a more or less stable and slowly decreasing trend for about 20 years, the 
government might have decided to intervene by increasing the prices for farmers. When 
prices started to increase the program was only used occasionally but it was ready for use 
whenever the government wanted to.  
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5. The Marketing System and Effects of Price Policies 
 
The rice marketing system in Thailand has a complex structure with many intermediaries and 
different systems for different types of rice. Both the government and private operators act in 
the system that roughly can be divided into two different levels; one for paddy rice and one 
for milled rice.  
  
5.1 Marketing System for Paddy 
The marketing system for paddy rice can be divided into two levels; local and central. 
Compared to other countries, Thailand’s marketing system is rather efficient with only about 
one month’s storage between harvests and wholesale. The short storage time is made possible 
by the Thai rice policies that allow international trade to play an essential role in the Thai rice 
economy. Due to the short storage time, seasons do not affect farm gate prices to a great 
extent and marketing costs are reduced (Dawe et al. 2008, p. 459).   
 There are five actors at the local level in the marketing system; the farmers, local 
traders, brokers, farmers’ organisations and government agencies. Some of the farmers sell 
their rice directly to the millers however, since most farmers are small and do not own 
trucks´, local buyers collect paddy rice from farmers or local markets and transport it to the 
mills where they sell it. The local buyers are usually a village shop owner or sometimes also 
a farmer. The ones that frequently collect rice of different varieties and qualities usually 
contract medium and larger millers since they know where to buy rice of specific types 
(Wiboonpongse and Chaovanapoonphol, 200, p. 195).   
 There are two types of farmers’ organisations at the local level. The first one is the 
Farmers Group which is a legal unit of at least 30 farmers that act together to increase their 
barging power on the market. The Farmers Groups work together in marketing activities, 
hiring and acquiring of facilities etc., and they sometimes organize and operate transports, 
equipment and storage. They may also perform financial transactions. The Farmers Groups 
sell their paddy directly to traders or millers.  
 The second form of organisation is the agricultural cooperative which collects paddy 
from its members and transports it to larger cooperatives and millers. Some of the 
cooperatives mill the rice for members and sell it to the market. Only a very few agricultural 
cooperatives are specialized in milling and marketing of rice (Wiboonpongse and 
Chaovanapoonphol, 2001, p. 195).  
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 The Thai government also operates at the local level in the rice marketing system. 
The government has agents that buy rice directly from the farmers at a guaranteed minimum 
price which is usually above the market price. In 1996 the government agencies were buying 
around 4.4 percent of all rice sold by farmers, and in recent years this number has increased 
due to the mortgage program which has made it more attractive for farmers to sell to the 
government agencies.  
 Brokers and commission agents act at all levels of the rice marketing system but their 
percentage at the local level is rather small. The brokers’ main purpose is to create market 
connections between millers and exporters or wholesalers and help wholesalers and exporters 
to find rice of specific varieties and qualities. Almost all millers use brokers in order to find 
rice in the quantities and qualities that the exporters and wholesalers want; only a few large 
millers sell directly to exporters and wholesalers. At the local level, brokers procure rice from 
the farmers and sell either to millers or to local traders (Wiboonpongse and 
Chaovanapoonphol, 2001, p. 196). The role of private traders has been reduced due to the 
introduction of central wholesale markets (Dawe et al. 2008, p. 257).   
 In main production areas there are central paddy markets set up by government 
agencies or by the private sector. The privately owned central markets backed by the 
Ministry of Commerce function as a meeting place for assemblers, traders and millers. 
Depending on the size of the market place, different services and facilities are provided. 
Usually the market place provides labour, drying lawns for the rice, gauges to control 
moisture, storerooms and sometimes also loans. The owners of the market places earn profits 
from these services and facilities, but do not usually get involved in the rice trade 
(Wiboonpongse and Chaovanapoonphol, 2001, pp. 196-197). 
 The market centres set up by the government are managed by two different ministries 
and functions as government procurement centres. According to the study done by 
Wiboonpongse and Chaovanapoonpohl (2001), there are 176 sub district paddy centres run 
by the Department of Agricultural Extension, Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives. The centres provide similar facilities and services to the privately owned 
market centres; drying lawns, warehouses and weighing equipment etc. The BAAC have 
three market places, one in each major producing region; north, northeast and central 
(Wiboonpongse and Chaovanapoonphol,  2001, p. 196).   
 The introduction of the wholesale paddy markets made the marketing system in 
Thailand more effective. Due to the markets and the agents working to find the right types of 
rice, the search costs in Thailand are kept low compared to other countries. Despite the 
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markets proven benefits, it is believed that the current government policy concerning rice is 
reducing the importance of the wholesale markets (Dawe et al. 2008, p. 456). 
 
5.2 Marketing System for Milled Rice 
From the local and central levels, all the paddy rice has to pass through a miller, which is 
where the main processing activity takes place, before it can be sold further. There are small, 
medium and large millers of which the small millers serve farmers and villages for which 
they mill for consumption. Medium sized and large millers mill for local, regional and 
sometimes also export markets (Wiboonpongse and Chaovanapoonphol,  2001, p. 201). In 
the past years small and medium sized millers have had increased difficulties staying 
competitive and the number of mills has been steadily decreasing. In 2007, there were many 
thousands of mills scattered around the country but only around 900 were large. One problem 
is that many of the mills, especially the smaller and medium sized ones, employ inefficient 
technology. Larger millers have upgraded their technology for both production and packing 
and many of them have received standards such as Good Manufacturing Practises (GMP), 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Points (HACCP) during the past decade (Vanichanont, 2004, p. 4). Due to the 
financial system in Thailand, that can provide low interest loans, there is opportunity for 
expansion of existing mills and entrance for new ones, which is competitiveness enhancing. 
Compared to countries like the Philippines though, mills in Thailand are more efficient 
(Dawe et al. 2008, p. 457).   
 From the millers, rice can take different paths before it reaches its final destination. 
The largest share of milled rice is bought by commission agents who help exporters and 
wholesalers to find the right qualities and varieties of rice. There are more than 100 exporting 
companies in Thailand and they are a very strong sector in the rice industry (Vanichanont, 
2004, p. 4). Due to the mortgage programme, the government has increased its procurements 
of rice and therefore also its exports. In 2007 the rice exports by the government increased to 
around one million tons, which was around twelve percent of total exports for that year 
(BOT, 2007).  
 Government agencies also buy a substantial share of rice from millers. The 
government agencies then sell the rice to wholesalers who sell it on to retailers and finally to 
consumers. Some rice is sold directly from the millers to exporters or even to foreign 
importers, but only the really large millers sell directly. In the same manner millers 
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sometimes sell directly to wholesalers, retailers or even consumers, but only a small 
percentage of the rice is sold in this way (Wiboonpongse and Chaovanapoonphol, 2001, pp. 
198-200).  
 As explained above, the rice marketing system might not seem so complicated. 
However, there is a large number of paths that rice can take among the different actors. What 
makes the marketing system even more complicated is that different types of rice have 
slightly different marketing systems. Figure 3 below shows the marketing system for rice in 
general and is based on a map by Wiboonpongse and Chaovanapoonphol (2001)10.  
 
Figure 3: Marketing System for Rice 
 
 
 
Source: Wiboonpongse and Chaovanapoonphol (2001), p. 198 
 
 
5.3 Price Determination and Price Transmission 
Economic theory states that if there are many buyers and sellers of a good, monopoly is 
constrained. If the market system is efficient, there will also be efficient prices and the 
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marketing system and therefore the percentages of purchases stated in the study are not replicated 
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government will abstain from price fixing and there will be an efficient allocation in the 
production of goods (Lindblom 2001, pp. 140-146). 
 The prices of agricultural products are usually determined in the retail markets from 
which the prices are transmitted to the producers (farm gate prices). Before the Thaksin 
Shinawatra government introduced the mortgage program for rice, it was found that the 
paddy prices in Thailand at the beginning of the 2000s were determined by a combination of 
local demand for and supply of rice as well as the demand from regions suffering from 
scarcity and demand for exports (Wiboonpongse and Chaovanapoonphol, 2001). According 
to a study by Siamwalla et al. (1981) local demand and supply were the most important 
factors in determining the price since around 67 percent of all rice produced was consumed 
in the same area at the time of the study. However, this is likely to have changed over time 
and is also likely to be different in different regions since the supply and demand patterns are 
different. Further influences on the prices, mentioned in the study by Wiboonpongse and 
Chaovanapoonphol, (2001) even if not to a large extent, were government intervention.  
 In the aforementioned study, high competitiveness in the rice sector is assumed since 
a large number of commission agents were active in the trade and there were a large number 
of sellers and buyers. The large size of the domestic rice trade also provided competition. 
Further, the actors in the paddy market system indicated that they were price takers. Millers 
and other actors with storage capacity can choose to sell their rice at times when prices are 
high, which most farmers can not do. It was found that all intermediaries were using the 
method of mark-down pricing i.e. that the expected selling price minus costs and a certain 
profit would constitute the buying price (Wiboonpongse and Chaovanapoonphol, 2001, p. 
202). 
 Further, prices were found to be transmitted both backward and forward between 
different levels in the marketing system in both the short run and the long run but the market 
was found to be more efficient in the short run. Later studies of the marketing system in 
Thailand also conclude that the system is efficient and that since Thailand is very open to 
trade in rice, the domestic prices are largely dictated by the world market prices and the 
exchange rates to some extent (Dawe et al. 2008).   
 
5.4 The Mortgage Program Effects on Rice Prices and the Market 
As mentioned above in the policy section, the Taksin Shinawatra government introduced a 
rice price policy that would guarantee farmers a certain minimum price for their paddy. 
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When the price policy was introduced by the Samak government, the arguments for the 
mortgage program were to increase rice prices for Thai farmers so as to increase their living 
standards and most importantly to prevent price fluctuations around the time for harvest. 
Even though prices have increased sharply since the end of 2007, the Thai government still 
implements the mortgage program. After stopping the program after the first crop, in June 
2008, the government decided to continue the program for the second crop of 2008. The 
program started on the 15th of June and run until the 30th of September. The government 
argued that implementing the program also for the second crop was necessary in order to 
increase the supply of rice, increase exports and increase their stockpiles (PRD 2008-08-05).  
 For the second crop in 2008, the guaranteed price for white paddy of a specific 
quality was set at 14,000 baht per ton which was around 20 percent higher than the market 
price11 at the time of the decision making and it was the highest pledging price ever. 
According to Ponnarong Prasertsri (2008) the implementation of the mortgage program for 
the second crop could influence domestic as well as export prices to increase again because 
the intervention price is usually used as the point of reference for market prices. An 
intervention price of 14,000 baht per ton of white high quality rice could result in a recovery 
of export prices to at least $US 900 per metric ton. However, since the price peak in April 
prices have been declining and there has not yet been a recovery. By August the price of 
white Thai rice five percent broken had declined to 693.5 $US per metric ton (Prasertsri 
2008, p. 2).  
 One of the more instantaneous effects of the high pledging price was a suspension of 
purchases from exporters and millers since they considered the price to be too high. Rice 
millers also considered the requirements for the mortgage program to be unclear and too high 
to join. They also lacked access to the large amounts of credit required (The Nation 2008-06-
16).  
 Another effect was an immediate decrease of export orders when importing countries 
decided to wait for the Vietnamese harvest since Vietnamese rice is much cheaper. The 
president of the Rice Exporters Association Mr Chookiat Ophaswongse has been highly 
critical and argues that the continuation of the program, especially after the world market 
prices have declined, will damage the Thai rice market in both the short run and the long run. 
A factor further contributing negatively to the situation is that the Thai export volume is 
                                                
11
 The fob export price of Thai white rice, five percent broken were in June (average) 757 $US/ton 
which was roughly around 22700 baht. 
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expected to decrease due to the increase of the world supply, in turn the result of an increased 
production worldwide due to the high prices (The Nation 2008-06-10).  
 Due to guaranteed prices high above the market prices government stocks have been 
building up. In August 2008, the stocks amounted up to 2.82 million tons of which most is 
five percent broken white rice. The Thai government announced that it planned to sell out 
some of the intervention stock as exports to make room for new mortgage procurements.   
 According to the Dean of the Economic Faculty of Thammasat University Mr. Nipon 
Poapongsakorn, the policy will only be useful to the farmers in the short run. In the long run 
it will have a largely negative impact. As a result of the policy the farmers are discouraged 
from concentrating on the quality of their rice and on increasing their productivity 
(Poapongsakorn 2007). When a government fixes prices, the efficiency of allocation in 
production is harmed. If the market system is efficient it accomplishes capital creation, 
technological innovation and entrepreneurs. This results in efficiency and growth. An 
efficient market system motivates all participants in the market (Lindblom 2001, pp. 140-
146).  
 The National Rice Policy Committee argued that due to increasing production costs, 
the government had to continue with the mortgage program after being pressured by farmers 
who had to borrow money in order to plant their rice (Reuters 2008-04-20). However, 
planting costs were found to be less then 7000 baht per ton in June 2008 (The Nation 2008-
06-10).  Even though huge sums are spent on the mortgage program, it has been found that 
the farmers are not benefiting fully from the program (BOT 2007). Hence, the main targets 
for the mortgage program are not able to fully reap the benefits from it. Another problem has 
been the corruption that has followed due to the fact that government officials with lack of 
knowledge have been involved in the rice procurement instead of private actors. There have 
also been reports of mishandling and bad organization in some provinces (The Nation 2008-
06-16).   
 
5.5 Discussion 
Before the minimum price policy was introduced, the study by Wiboonpongse and 
Chaovanapoonphol (2001) concluded that the Thai rice market was well integrated and that 
the marketing system was effective. However, the minimum price policy has reversed the 
integration of the market and disrupted the market forces since prices are fixed, thus not 
reflecting supply and demand. Disrupting the market forces will have effects on capital 
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creation, technological innovation and the motivation of entrepreneurs and other participants 
in the market.     
 The Thai government’s decision to implement the mortgage program for both the first 
and the second crop of 2008, at the pledging price of 10,000 and 14,000 baht per ton 
respectively, must be considered with the price development in the world markets of different 
commodities in mind. The prices of various staple crops had been skyrocketing since the end 
of the previous year, and the costs of inputs for farmers such as oil and fertilizers had also 
become very expensive. Many farmers had to borrow money to buy inputs and due to the 
sharp increases in the prices for rice, many farmers also borrowed money in order to be able 
to plant a second crop in 2008.  
 Other factors influencing the policy decisions by the government are their goals for 
the rice sector and political support maximization. Since farmers still constitute a very large 
share of the population and the majority of the poor, and they have become better educated 
and well organized, their political influence is large. As a result of these factors, the 
government reached the conclusions that implementing the mortgage program at the 
specified pledging prices was the right policy decision.  
 World prices of rice started to decline at the end of April and after the implementation 
on the 15th of June, world prices declined even more. Instead of having a pledging price 
around 20 percent higher than the market price, the pledging price was much higher than that 
at the end of the program. This shows how difficult it is to predict not only the effects of a 
policy but also how the economic environment in which the policy will be implemented can 
change, changing the premises on which the policy is built. This is one of the main criticisms 
against interventions and distorting policies. Due to this fact, it is very important to construct 
sound policies that do not create major distortions and that can be reassessed and altered 
when needed.     
 It is extremely difficult to predict what will happen in the world market for specific 
commodities. For a limited market such as the rice market, where the development in 
individual countries can have substantial effects, it is even more difficult to predict the future 
development. The rice market is also special because of the major impact rice prices have 
socially, economically and politically in many countries in the world, especially the Asian 
countries. This makes the governments more sensitive to the development in the world 
market. This was proven when the rice prices started to increase at the end of 2007 and many 
governments acted quickly by limiting exports or eliminating import taxes etc. The Thai 
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government also acted by reintroducing the mortgage program and increasing the pledging 
price so as to increase the rice supply and the exports.  
 The price policy, which aims at supporting the poor farmers and guarantees them a 
higher price, was implemented during a time when the world market prices were higher than 
they had been in almost 30 years. And the program for the second crop was implemented 
when world prices started to decline. There are two possible explanations for this. Either the 
Thai government failed to predict the development on the world rice market and presumed 
that the declining prices were only temporary, or they chose to implement the program 
anyway in order to help farmers who had borrowed money to grow a second crop and who 
might have had problems paying back their debts if prices had declined too much. By doing 
this, the government gained more support in the countryside. Since the government is 
relatively new and there has been political turmoil for about the past two and half years, the 
Samak government might have valued farmers support higher than the mortgage programs’ 
large financing costs.  
 Even if political objectives were the main influence on the policy decision, it is still 
difficult to understand from an economic point of view. What makes the government’s policy 
decision surprising is that several studies of agricultural policies, whereof the World Banks’ 
World Development Report 2008 is one of the latest, clearly state that subsidies and 
protection will not help farmers to improve their situations in the long term. Accredited Thai 
economists such as Mr. Nipon Poapongsakorn have clearly criticized the policy and yet the 
government decided to implement it. If the policy makes the farmers’ situation worse in the 
long run it will become a problem for the governments to come. Thus, implementing the 
policy is a sign of short term political thinking. 
 Not only has the minimum price policy been criticized by economists at the World 
Bank and Thai economists, but also by key persons within the rice trade. The mortgage 
program has had a negative impact on the Thai rice market in the sense that the functioning 
of the market mechanism has been distorted. The pledged prices have resulted in distortions 
in production and caused problems for the trade. Rice importing countries postponed their 
imports in order to await cheaper rice from other producer countries, which has harmed the 
Thai exporters. 2008 might be the first year in a long time in which the Thai export volume 
of rice decreased compared to pervious years, instead of the increase which was expected in 
the beginning of the year. Thai rice millers have also expressed their discontent with the 
policy due to high requirements to join the program and unclear rules for participation. As for 
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the farmers, they have criticized the way the program has been organized in some areas 
where there have been problems with the implementation of the program.  
 In the short run farmers might gain from the higher prices since they enhance their 
profits, but in the long run they might have more to lose if the higher prices destroy their 
incentives to decrease costs and increase efficiency. Without enhancing efficiency and 
reducing costs, they will rapidly lose competitiveness on the world market and therefore face 
difficulties when the mortgage program is not in use.  
 As a result of the mortgage program the Thai rice market, which used to be well 
functioning and well integrated, has been damaged and is now not functioning in an 
economically sound way. The Thai rice sector has lost some of its competitiveness in the 
world market.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
Countries formulate agricultural policies depending on the orientation of their agricultural 
sector or design specific policies for different agricultural commodities and what the market 
looks like. It is common that developing countries tax their agricultural sectors since it is 
feasible, and revenues from the tax are used to develop industries and support poor urban 
workers. On the other hand, in developed countries agriculture only represents a very small 
part of the economy and is usually subject to extensive protection. Getting the policies right 
is crucial for the development of the agricultural sector, for the development of rural areas 
and for the incomes of the rural population. But designing efficient policies is very difficult 
and the effects of policies are often not known or impossible to predict in advance. The 
economic environment in which they are implemented can also change, further making 
policy decisions more difficult. Due to different agendas and capacity, politicians might not 
construct the best policies from an economic point of view, but rather from a political point 
of view. 
 Looking at the development of rice policies, especially price policies, in Thailand 
several things are discovered. Since Thailand’s agricultural sector always has been export 
oriented, the economy has been very open to international trade and the development in the 
world rice market. Policies have aimed at stabilizing domestic prices and have been altered 
during the years according to the development in the world market. The export orientation of 
the rice sector has had a large impact on the types of policies available for the politicians.  
 The developments of the Thai economy and the Thai rice sector have been even more 
influential on the policy decisions. As the country has industrialized and the economy has 
developed, the rice sector has had a diminishing share of GDP and the share of population 
involved in rice production have decreased. Simultaneously the rural population has become 
better educated, their political awareness has increased and they have become better 
organized. With the industrialization, the urban incomes have increased rapidly and the 
income of the rural areas has lagged behind and, thus, income disparities have increased. 
These developments have profoundly influenced the policy making. Starting with policies 
that heavily taxed producers, benefited consumers and the urban population, the policy 
changed slowly. By the end of the 20th century, Thailand’s rice policy had become very 
neutral. At the beginning of the 21st century the policy evolved into markedly favouring 
producers when the mortgage program was introduced. Until this point, the domestic rice 
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policies in Thailand had been very sensible and not very distorting. However, the 
reintroduction of the mortgage program for the first and second crops in 2008, at very high 
pledging prices caused a lot of damage to the domestic rice industry. The reasons for 
introducing the policy must mainly been political and not economical. The peculiar political 
situation in Thailand might have triggered the new government to launch the program to 
secure support from the farmers, this while arguing that the policy had to be put in place for 
economic reasons. But judging from the reactions from economists and people involved in 
the rice trade and the situation in the world rice market, the economic rationale for 
introducing the policy at this time was very weak. The short term results of the policy have 
been a slowdown in exports, high domestic prices and large government expenditure. The 
domestic market has been harmed and integration has been reversed because the mortgage 
program distorted the market forces. In the long run the program will have more far reaching 
negative consequences if it distorts the incentives for farmers to enhance productivity and 
decrease costs. If the market forces are allowed to be distorted for a longer period, it can also 
destroy capital creation, technological innovation and motivation for all participants in the 
market. This affects the growth and the efficiency. The Thai rice sector might lose more of its 
competitiveness which has already been damaged due to the high prices of Thai rice 
compared to, for example, Vietnamese rice.  
 Since the mortgage program for the second crop has just finished, the full effects of it 
will not be known until later. An evaluation of the program and its effects is necessary and 
the government should revise its policy, especially the level of the pledging price.              
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